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Defection is not an unfamiliar term for parliamentary democracies like India. Though the evilpractice was present since the preindependence era, the advent of the multiparty systemresulting in coalition governments increased floor crossing.
The instabilities in the weak regimes followed by the political turmoil leading to the rise and fall of governments raised the demand for a law on regulating defection. Addressing popular demand, the 52nd Amendment Act of 1985 (India Const. amend. LII, 1985) was brought into the picture which added, the 10th schedule to the constitution (India Const. Sch. X). The law was drafted with due care and attention to retain political preferences and the public’s choice. This legislation provided for the disqualification of members in case of defection except for a split or a merger
Manasa Murali & Rutu Muppidi (2025) "A Critical Analysis of AntiDefection Law Through an Economic Lens ", GNLU Journal of Law And Economics : Volume VII 2024, Issue II
Available at:
https://gnlu.ac.in/GJLE/Publications/A Critical Analysis of AntiDefection Law Through an Economic Lens
The essay examines the violence that unfurled in Bangladesh in 2024 from the lens of the relativedeprivation theory to explain the role of perceived inequality in political violence, and the prospecttheory to explain the role of prospect losses as a motivation for individuals to participate inpolitical violence. The essay analyses the events that acted as a trigger for the social unrest andfocuses on the contentious quota to explain the decisionmaking process of the players involved,from the viewpoint of the prospect theory. The essay also looks at macroeconomic variables suchas youth unemployment, inflation etc. during both the years that marked a social unrest among thegeneral population and found that in both years, the economy had shown worrying trends. Theessay also looks at the role of costs and benefits as perceived by an individual while making achoice in a risky situation. The conceptual framework is further demonstrated by a game wherethe decisionmaking process of the government, as a player, is discussed. It is found that theequilibrium for both the players is at the first outcome, where the participation is met withsuppression by the government. The most ideal outcome for both the parties is a peaceful approachto the issue at hand. Based on the existing research, and the game theory, policy recommendationshave been formulated emphasizing the need for a stronger penal system, to augment the costs thatare associated with participation in violence, and to make infrastructural developments to addressthe socioeconomic issues at hand. The establishment of transparent communication channelswould also go a long way in mitigating the risks of future unrest.